Summary

Democratic institutions such as modern parliaments are inspired by the concept of rule by and for the people. The concept envisions a polity of " the people," or Demos, who choose their representatives to Parliament and in whose name Parliament deliberates and decides on laws and policies. Parliament is the symbol and agent of Demos. In European societies (as well as most other parts of the world), it is also the major basis for legitimizing political authority and legislation. No other societal agents - whether government agencies, intergovernmental authorities such as OECD, World Bank, World Trade Organization, or non-government organizations (NGOs), political parties, and groups of scientists and experts - can compete with Parliament in symbolizing "the people" and providing political legitimacy(1). Parliament, however, is not only a symbol of a polity but its agent, ultimately accountable to "the people" for laws and regulation.
Yet today many of the most important changes in society take place through mechanisms beyond the scope of parliamentary purview. Some of these changes may threaten to have, or are already having, significant negative impacts on economic, political, and cultural dimensions of life and are, therefore, matters of considerable public concern. If Parliament is not to be marginalized in the face of globalization and other major societal transformations, new conceptions and institutional arrangements must be considered. The clock cannot be turned back to simpler, more consistent arrangements for governance. Modern society is all too differentiated, too complicated and dynamic to be overseen in any detail from a 'center'. At the same time, there has emerged in many policy areas a variety of highly flexible and adaptable forms of 'self-governance' that make the old forms of regulation - e.g., detailed legal and administrative regulation - less applicable and less effective. This is particularly so in the case of specialized, technically advanced sectors of modern society.
This Green Paper first identifies several of the social and political forces at work transforming the conditions and problems of contemporary policy-making and regulation. Next, it considers the implications of these developments for parliamentary democracy. Finally, it discusses possible responses of Parliament to these new realities. In particular, it explores the desirability and possibilities - in the context of ongoing societal transformations - of re-conceptualizing and reforming the role and practices of parliaments. It identifies several of the opportunities for revitalizing and re-establishing Parliament's central role as a collective representative and authority in modern societies.
The fundamental question with respect to major societal changes is one of governance - in particular the patterns of responsibility/accountability and authority(2). Five key functions of a modern Parliament, which entail problems in the context of the governance transformation discussed here, are(3):

• policy making,
• legitimation of collective decisions and policies.
• oversight of government and other authorities,
• maintenance of a public space for discussion and reflection,
• protection and maximum realization of the values of transparency, accountability, and open democratic process with respect to Parliament itself as well governance processes currently operating outside of Parliament purview.

These functions are interrelated, as we shall see in the following discussion.
Part I of the Paper analyzes the transformation of governance and regulative mechanisms whereby new forms of regulation and politics are being created both within a society and beyond its boundaries. In a word, there is a reconfiguration of political power. The Paper stresses the increasing scientification of politics (in particular, the regular and systematic use of expertise). It also emphasizes the expanding role of organizations (especially, non-government organizations) as vehicles of collective decision making. Contemporary policy making is more and more characterized by the engagement of multiple agents, not only those formally responsible. These include appropriate government authorities (GOs), business and other relevant interests along with NGOs, and international government and inter-governmental agencies such as IMF, World Bank, and OECD, as well as groups of experts. Representatives of Parliament may or may not be involved in the policy group or process. In general, major legislative and policy-making activities are being substantially displaced from parliamentary bodies and central governments to global, regional, and local agents as well as agents operating in the many specialized sectors of a differentiated, modern society. In other words, governance is increasingly diffused - upward, downward and outward - beyond Parliament and its government.
Direct participation in public or collective problem-solving and policy-making has never been so widespread and far-reaching as today. But this entails something new: the participation of groups and organizations more than that of autonomous, individual citizens. The new emerging governance order is largely one of organizations, by organizations, and for the organizations, involving as well a significant role for experts. The development of new governance arrangements entails substantial changes in key components of political order such as the following four dimensions: sovereignty, representation, responsibility and accountability, and the very character of law and regulation.
The emerging complex of governance has major implications for the role of Parliament. Modern governance -- increasingly divided into semi-autonomous, specialized sectors -- is multi-level and multi-polar; it is also democratic, at least in the sense that there is adherence to norms of mutual respect, due process, and collective deliberation. There is a de facto diffusion of authority and decision-making into specialized policy sectors in civil society as well as a decentralization downwards into regions and municipalities and a "centralization" upwards into international institutions and networks. Under these conditions, there is no longer a single center. Consequently, it is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain the public image of the centrality of, for instance, parliamentary democracy in the face of growing gaps between, on the one hand, its acknowledged responsibilities and, on the other, its actual capabilities of governing. First, there are cognitive and knowledge limitations: Parliament and its government are not - and cannot be expected to perform as - specialized experts or research organizations. Second, there are organizational limitations. Reflect for a moment on the problems of regulating from a single national or international center the diverse and dynamic processes of modern society relating to, among other things, commerce, industry, financial and monetary institutions, the production of diverse government services, research, education, public health care, bio-technologies and life science developments, gender relations, globalization, etc. One could continue listing. The point is clear. Detailed regulation from the center - through laws and government policies - of such great diversity is not a feasible undertaking. Attempts at such regulation are doomed to be counter-productive and the source of new, possibly magnified instabilities and regulative problems.
The new types of governance, while flexible and consistent with norms of self-governance - all to the good - allow also for ready abuse of power and new forms of corruption. Economically well-endowed groups as well as highly organized groups and impassioned movements with focused interests can concentrate on policy areas of particular concern to them. They are not only highly motivated but can mobilize the resources to "pay" for participation and for the "transaction costs" of policymaking. They can coopt, buy off, and in innumerable ways bias the policy-making process to their own advantage. Their engagements may take perverse forms such as irresponsible private governments, powerful state-business interlocks, and violation of democratic principles and forms of governance.
In the diverse, specialized forms of non-parliamentary governance, large, unwieldy citizen populations and groups with broad collective interests are at an obvious disadvantage, whereas in parliamentary democracy their votes sometimes count in expressing dissatisfaction or in bringing about the replacement or circulation of political elites. The powerlessness of diffuse citizen populations, even large ones, is apparent in policy arenas where economically well-endowed agents as well as highly organized groups and intense (or "impassioned") minorities with focused interests can mobilize expertise and other resources and conduct effectively disciplined discourses, negotiations and policy-making. The problem here is not only that most individual citizens lack comparable resources to compete with, for instance, multi-national corporations or with highly mobilized interest groups or movements in the new governance structure. But there is also the problem that many populations and groups of people lack minimal capabilities and resources to mobilize themselves, to articulate goals or demands, and to negotiate changes in policy. This is especially the case of highly marginalized groups, such as immigrants, who often lack citizen rights, education and the resources to organize and engage effectively in the new forms of governance. In general, there are substantial risks of massive abuses of power in the emerging governance order; this is a major reason for developing normative concepts and regulative regimes to address such problems.
Arguably, there is a significant gap between the explicit normative theory of democracy and many contemporary practices of governance. The normative theory orients us to representative parliamentarism based on popular sovereignty. The emerging governance complex - referred to in the Paper as organic governance - involves diverse interests, associations, lobbies, and organizations often representing themselves and directly engaging in various forms of policymaking and regulation. The substantial gap between democratic theory and actual practices and other related problems are of concern to some political leaders and citizen groups as well as to several segments of the general public. For many there is a sense of institutional crisis; for some, there is a growing "democratic deficit" in the context of globalization and other transformations.
Part II of the Paper identifies several potential opportunities for Parliament to position itself in relation to, and to deal with, these societal transformations and emerging problem complexes.
First, attention is given to ways of enhancing parliamentary access to, and capacity to use, high quality information. The Paper suggests that the quality and legitimacy of parliamentary performance can be improved, in general, through reforming parliamentary knowledge systems, functions, and roles. Parliament would be better able to deal with several major contemporary problems such as revolutionary technological developments, fragmentation of society, globalization, the emergence of a major class of influential political agents such as NGOs, and the power of experts. In this context, it is essential for Parliament to establish greater accountability and transparency for the far-reaching and diverse policy- and 'law'-making that goes on outside of the normal domain of Parliament and its government, for instance in private or semi-public settings. Consideration of this relates to a general need to enhance the capacity of Parliament to monitor and regulate contemporary governance developments(4).
Among the relevant points emphasized in the Green Paper is that parliament should try to protect and maximize the realization of the values of transparency, accountability, and open democratic procedures in the emerging complex of contemporary governance.
New potential parliamentary roles and measures are discussed. For instance,Parliament or its government may consider regulating and legitimizing specialized sector groups or communities with their mixtures of agents, government organizations, NGOs and lobbyists, and specialized experts, etc(5). This could be accomplished by, for instance, explicitly authorizing or empowering them as one has done in the past for cities, private universities, or other incorporated entities. It could explicate the concept of a citizenship of organizations, and define in public law or in the constitution the role, and rights and obligations, of organizations participating in governance which is of substantial public concern. This involves establishing basic norms and organizing principles for them -- without restricting unnecessarily their freedom and self-governance. A further task is to define and regulate the role of expertise, formulating explicitly the character of the role, the duties, responsibilities, and accountability of expertise and scientists in democratic politics. Currently, the status of such participants, and their exercise of influence in policy- and law-making, whether direct or indirect, is highly ambiguous. Indeed, one claim for the involvement of experts in governance processes is that they contribute to making "right" decisions, laws, and policies (although these may be incompatible with the wishes of citizens or of Parliament). However, the role of expertise is not grounded in a normative theory of democracy, but in principles of rationality (key elements of the modern world)(6). Democratic constitutions or public law typically say little or nothing about the role of experts, their powers, responsibilities and accountability, in either government or governance processes. This gap should be filled. One should try to raise public consciousness about (1) some of the differences between specialized expertise and basic value issues; and (2) the fact that scientific expertise (which is not always as neutral as assu med) should be subject to monitoring and norms of appropriate public involvement and accountability(7).
A proper modern constitution might refer then not only to Parliament, formal government, and citizens but to organizations, other agents of civil society, and experts. It would also articulate and legitimize particular standards or ideal forms of organic governance. This would entail specifying, among other things, rights, limits, responsibilities, means of transparency and accountability (as discussed below). Thus, the forms of organic governance would be constitutionally defined, regulated and more securely legitimated in a new democratic political order (which is partially already operating).
In sum, the Paper argues that Parliament, by adopting a role as meta-sovereign, could enhance its capacity to monitor and regulate current governance developments as well as to facilitate public participation in and learning about these new governance forms. It would define and enforce general democratic standards of governance. Among other things, this would entail establishing procedures for powerful governance groups or communities to be registered (and possibly chartered) and to give periodic accounts of their policy making and legislative activities just as government ministries do presently vis-a-vis Parliament.
The concluding part (Part III) compares the emerging self-governance forms with formal parliamentary democracy. It specifies some of the normative dimensions and prerequisites of the emerging governance processes.
The Paper stresses that while parliamentary democratic models have been situated in a particular territory with a defined population of citizens (Demos), which is homogenous, or aspires to homogeneity, the new forms are substantially different. They are manifestations of a diffused democratic culture of norms and procedures. These are applied in policy deliberations, whether in formal or informal settings, often regardless of territory and irrespective of nationality, ethnicity, religion, gender, etc.
This Green Paper is intended to increase the awareness of parliamentarians of the current transformations of policy-making and regulation and the role that Parliament could play in these developments. It emphasizes strengthening some of its functions and de-emphasizing others. It proposes that European parliaments play - as they are already playing in some areas - a major role with respect to current developments. In part, Parliament can do this by assuring that the values of transparency, accountability, and democratic procedure - which lie at the core of the European heritage - are guaranteed and developed in contemporary governance, whether public or private, or local, national, or international. The analysis of the Paper identifies the architecture of a potentially new political order, combining formal parliamentary and organic forms of governance.

1 Meny (1993:227) points out, '…..parliaments remains the forums of political life par excellence and, seen from this point of view, their audience, far from shrinking, has increased, thanks to the press, television, and radio, all of which are mediators and broadcaster of the parliamentary debate'.
2 Goverance refers to any institutionalized arrangement - whether public, private, or mixed -- to regulate economic, political, cultural, or social areas. Government is the institutional arrangement we know best; it can take a variety of forms. Private governance refers to self-organizing and self-regulating groups and communities such as stock exchanges, business associations, communities of diverse types, professions such as that of physicians certifying and licensing practitioners. In the past townships and private universities, among others, were established as formally designated self-governing entities. Mixed forms of governance, that is, public-private arrangements, are more and more common and are of particular interest in this paper.
3 This presupposes some common understandings of the multiple purposes and functions of parliaments. As the following discussion suggests, one function is to make collective decisions. We suggest later that Parliament through delegating authority or giving charters to groups to make collective decisions, the 'collective decision-making role of parliament' may be extended.
4 It should be stressed that this is not to advocate the return to some 'top-down' control of civil society. The point is to establish an explicit normative frame providing standards of behavior, and in particular, standards of openness, transparency, and accountability in key arenas of governance currently operating outside of parliamentary oversight. Some features of monitoring and holding accountable powerful private agents are already in place, at least with respect to certain types of activity; companies, stock markets, independent agencies, local governments are required to give accounts, above all, with respect to their income flows and budgets. The extension of the accounting of economic activities and budgets to other dimensions of the activities is currently developing rapidly in the form of "quality,""green," and "social"accounts. We fully recognize the risk here - indeed, a profound dilemma - of parliamentary monitoring and holding accountable private agents, a type of regulation that could be construed as a type of control exercised by dictatorships in relation to agents of civil society. However, these forms of regulation are in the spirit of regulating and requiring accounts from companies, stock markets, independent agencies, local governments, and non-profit organizations.
5 There are some differences in perspective among the members of the expert group about a number of the points outlined in the following discussion.
6 The principle of rationality is not particularly consistent with a principle of citizen sovereignty. See later.
7 We are grateful to Herberg Koegler for stressing this point.