Report by the President of the Italian Senate, Sen. Nicola  Mancino

Honourable Speakers, dear Colleagues,

The process of European integration is in a crucial phase. The Convention responsible for the drafting of a Charter of Rights, which is about to complete its task, will present the result of its work at the Biarritz European Council. In December, a few months from now, the Nice European Council will have to focus on a number of issues of great relevance with regard to the Union’s architecture after Amsterdam.

Today’s Conference is especially important, not only because of the high institutional level of its participants, but also because of the particular time in which it takes place: I believe we should take this opportunity to promote an increased involvement of the organs representing the peoples of the Union.

 1. Developments in the parliamentary debate on institutional reforms after  Amsterdam

The need to introduce further reforms had already been stressed upon the conclusion in July 1997 of the Amsterdam Treaty, which included a Protocol envisaging a new round of negotiations – in view of the EU enlargement - concerning the problems remained unsolved at the previous Intergovernmental Conference (IGC): revision of the Commission composition and a reweighting of votes in the Council. Also enclosed in the Treaty is a declaration signed by Belgium, France and Italy, which stresses the need to substantially extend qualified majority voting.

1.1 Effectiveness of EU action with regard to the enlargement and the democratic deficit

Aware of the need to solve the problems left unsettled in Amsterdam and in order to prevent the risk of a paralysis of the enlarged Union, national Parliaments and the European Parliament have promoted and intensified opportunities of meeting and debate, being convinced that the issue of the democratic legitimacy of EU institutions and the need to bring them closer to citizens are tightly linked to the need to promote the role of national Parliaments and the European Parliament in view of the revision of EU fundamental rules and decision-making processes.[1]

An indirect recognition of the need to increase the legitimacy and representativeness of EU institutions emerges from the decision to enclose in the Amsterdam Treaty – thanks to a decisive impulse provided by the 1996 Conferences of European Affairs Committees (COSAC) held in Rome and Dublin – a protocol concerning specifically the role of national Parliaments. The treaties thus came to recognise COSAC conferences and formally sanctioned the right of national Parliaments to be informed about the preparatory phases in the drafting of EU legislation.[2]

1.2 The Conference of Speakers in Vienna

The topic of institutional reforms has been addressed on the occasion of various inter-parliamentary meetings, including COSAC meetings, at roundtables promoted by the European Parliament and at informal meetings of the Chairmen of Foreign Affairs and European Affairs Committees. The Conference of Speakers addressed this topic on previous occasions, most recently at the informal Conference in Vienna on 1st December 1998, when Mr Langendries presented his report.[3]

Mr Langendries stressed the link between the strengthening of democratic legitimacy – in the European Union’s institutional framework - and the development and rationalisation of co-operation among Parliaments. He also underlined the distinction between the so-called institutional and procedural legitimacy on the one hand, and the so-called substantive legitimacy on the other. The former concerns the need to complete the reforms left unfinished by the Amsterdam Treaty[4], improve the functioning of European institutions and identify a new parliamentary model for the European Union, based on the complementary role of the European Parliament and national Parliaments. The latter is related to the European institutions’ capability to respond to the concrete needs of citizens on such themes as the environment, employment and social policies.

1.3 The debate on the future of Europe and the role of Parliaments

From the Vienna Conference onwards, the debate on these topics has evolved and given rise to the belief that the traditional approach related to intergovernmental negotiations on institutional reforms presents some limits. As a matter of fact, increased attention has been devoted to the role of Parliaments, which are no longer requested to intervene solely at the moment of ratifying the decisions taken during the negotiation phase: they do participate in and make their contribution to the whole reform process, as is happening for the organism drafting of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, which is significantly called “Convention” and includes – beside the 16 representatives of Governments and the Commission – as many as 46 members from national Parliaments and the European Parliament. We express our appreciation and gratitude for the work they are doing.

In the past few months, in the wake of the remarkable proposals advanced by different European politicians[5], various models have been proposed for the reorganisation of the Union. The debate, not confined to the kind of parliamentary control to be exerted, has been influenced by the need to restore a link between the effectiveness of governmental action at all levels and the representativeness of decision-making institutions, a topic on which a study has been promoted by the President of the European Commission, Mr Prodi.

1.4 The mandate of the Intergovernmental Conference defined at the Köln European Council

In June last year, the Köln European Council established that the mandate of the new Intergovernmental Conference would be defined at the next summit in Helsinki in view of the launching of the IGC during the Portuguese presidency in the first half of 2000. At the Helsinki European Council on 10-11 December 1999, some countries – wishing also to ensure compliance[6] with the enlargement calendar - expressed the view that the Intergovernmental Conference should focus on the three topics to be addressed under the Amsterdam Treaty in future negotiations, i.e. composition of the Commission, weighting of votes in the Council and extension of majority vote. Other countries[7] stressed the new Intergovernmental Conference should be an opportunity to have a broader discussion on the possible reforms leading to an increased effectiveness of EU institutions and bringing the European construction process closer to citizens.

This issue is connected to the need to promote – as a basis for institutional engineering – an effective dialogue on common objectives. In other words, it is important to clarify whether, in the contemporary world’s decisions, the democratic principle can be safeguarded only at the level of national States[8]. As a matter of fact, some phenomena which are part of the globalisation process and cross national borders should be regulated also at supranational level. Therefore, it is necessary to ensure the respect of competition principles, the protection of consumers, the adoption of social security measures for workers, the safety of on-line transactions, the protection of data and privacy. Moreover, co-ordinated efforts are needed to effectively fight international organised crime – including electronic crime -, face transnational environmental emergencies and adequately manage crises and humanitarian operations.

As underlined by all the statesmen taking part in the debate on European construction, nobody conceives European integration as something that happens to the detriment of national identities any longer. National identity, with its particular characteristics, should be seen as a factor enriching the common European identity from the cultural and institutional point of view. In this regard, an institutional model will have to be identified which, while respecting the principle of subsidiarity, makes it possible to exercise sovereignty at different levels, using for each context the most effective instrument. In this manner, a more effective example would be offered to the areas of the world affected by conflicts originating in the coexistence of various ethnic, cultural, national or religious identities.

1.5 Extension of the Intergovernmental Conference agenda

With respect to the definition of the IGC mandate, the Helsinki European Council reached consensus only on the three topics referred to as ‘leftovers’, but did not rule out the possibility to examine other amendments of the Treaty. The Portuguese Presidency was assigned the task of assessing the possibility to integrate the agenda of the new IGC, which started last 14 February in Brussels and is scheduled to end with the Nice European Council, during the French six-month Presidency, at the end of the year.

At the Feira European Council the Portuguese Presidency submitted a report highlighting the consensus emerged about the inclusion in the IGC agenda - beside the ‘leftovers’ - of the review of the mechanisms related to ‘reinforced co-operation’[9] but stressing also the difficulties connected to the introduction of further subjects in the IGC.

Various countries, including Italy, proposed to discuss other aspects as well, such as the development of provisions concerning the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) - also with a view to allowing the WEU to be finally absorbed into the EU institutional framework -, the integration of the Charter of Fundamental Rights into the treaties and the reorganisation of the treaties themselves.

The European Council did not make any formal decision which might prevent the adoption of different solutions at the Nice summit at the end of the year. Furthermore, considering several countries are opposed to the inclusion of further subjects into the agenda of the Intergovernmental Conference under way, a proposal was made to launch a new Intergovernmental Conference, after the Nice European Council, or to identify new procedures for the revision of treaties so as to start the examination of the necessary institutional reforms as early as next year.

However, the French Presidency and several Member States, including Italy, have voiced their unwillingness to conclude the current Intergovernmental Conference with an unsatisfactory Treaty.

It seems likely that the next European Council in Nice will have to deal with the three issues left unsolved in the Amsterdam Treaty, above all to avoid a EU paralysis in view of further enlargements. In addition to these topics, as well as the necessarily related topics such as the adjustments in the composition of other EU organs – e.g. Parliament, Court of Auditors, Court of Justice and Court of First Instance[10] – the issue of reinforced co-operation, whose inclusion in the agenda was already agreed upon in Feira, and – if possible – that of the Charter of Fundamental Rights will have to be addressed in conformity with the mandate of the Köln European Council.

 2. The Parliaments’ views on the so-called ‘leftovers’, institutional questions left  unsettled by the Amsterdam Treaty

The role of national Parliaments consists first of all in providing guidelines to Governments with regard to the issues subject to negotiations. The contribution made by individual Parliaments in advancing proposals and strengthening the democratic quality of the procedures aimed at solving pending institutional problems is becoming increasingly important and is having an impact on public opinion.

Of the three issues indicated in the Amsterdam Treaty, the most controversial in political terms – as noted also by Parliaments – concerns the extension of qualified majority voting in the Council’s decision-making process.

In this regard, the debate which has taken place within Parliaments seems to indicate – as was rightly stressed at the COSAC meeting in Lisbon last May – that the majority of them is in favour of using qualified majority voting as a general rule.

This view is shared, for example, by the Parliaments of Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg and Germany and the European Parliament. However, differences emerge with regard to the specific exemptions to the above principle, while all agree on maintaining the rule of unanimity with respect to constitutional matters - concerning issues of fundamental importance to the Union or requiring ratification by national Parliaments[11].

Settling this question appears essential to preserve the effectiveness of EU decision-making processes and prevent a paralysis when the EU gets to include nearly thirty members.

Connected to the issue of the extension of qualified majority vote[12] is the less controversial issue of reweighting votes in the Council. In this respect, the objective is to ensure that decisions made by majority mirror not only the majority of Member States but also the majority of the Union’s people. As compliance with this principle would not be ensured if the present weighting system were left in place after enlargement, two main alternative methods have been proposed. The first envisages the application of a system[13] based on a double majority - of countries and peoples - and no reweighting. This proposal is opposed by the countries fearing that the Council’s decision-making process may become too complicated, and by some countries which would have to give up one Commissioner if the composition of the EU executive were reshaped. For those countries the best solution would be a simple revision of weighting criteria, with an increased weight for the vote expressed by highly populated countries.

With respect to the composition of the Commission, the main concern regards the need to safeguard its functioning in an enlarged Union including about thirty members. In this regard, some maintain that each country should have a European Commissioner[14]; others, including Italy, would prefer to establish the number of Commissioners regardless of the number of Member States[15]. Another possibility, however, would consist in maintaining one Commissioner for each country while envisaging a different organisation of the Commission, with the establishment of a sort of Cabinet composed of the President and the Vice Presidents[16] or the introduction of Commissioners without portfolio, i.e. having special tasks assigned by the President[17].

 3. The debate on reinforced co-operation

The debate on the definition of the IGC agenda focused on the importance of reinforced co-operation, which some prefer to call reinforced integration, a tool which might act as a bridge between the future Nice Treaty and later stages. Streamlining the rules laid down in the Amsterdam Treaty in order to launch reinforced co-operation actions might enable a number of Member States to strengthen integration in sectors like economic policy, judicial and police co-operation or security and defence policy, where consensus is not in sight.

Such ‘pioneering’ countries, as they have been called, would lay down the blue print of the whole of the European Union. The provisions on the single currency and the incorporation of the Schengen agreements into the European Union – which do not apply to all Member States – provide an inspiring example in this respect.

In order to work properly, this mechanism, which was foreseen by the Amsterdam Treaty but has so far never been applied, must be changed, according to a number of Governments, amongst which Italy, France and Luxembourg: abolition of the power of veto of those countries which do not take part in it from the start; its extension to the CFSP; reduction of the number of countries necessary to start the mechanism.

In the absence of an agreement on the streamlining of the above-mentioned procedures, some warn against the risk of a reinforced co-operation taking place outside the treaties. In this respect, experience shows[18] that it may be difficult to incorporate the agreements concluded outside the EU context and that access to such agreements may become more difficult for those countries which did not take part in them from the start.

The introduction of more flexible rules on reinforced co-operation in the context of treaties would strengthen the open and inclusive character of such initiatives, enable the countries which had initially ‘opted out’ to easily have access to them and ensure compliance with the Union’s general interests. According to the views expressed by several Parliaments, it is important to ensure such compliance and maintain to this end a single institutional framework, avoiding the creation of new structures and ad hoc secretariats and encouraging the flexibility of present EU institutions (Parliament, Court and Commission); in particular, it is important to maintain the role of the Commission as the institution which guarantees compliance with the treaties[19].

Even the above mentioned approach may raise concerns, however, and should be discussed in the appropriate fora by the representatives of Parliaments: it would be unwise to avoid discussing the controversial aspects which need further examination. In particular, it is important to prevent reinforced co-operation from causing a delay in the examination of a more important issue: the extension of qualified majority voting in ordinary procedures. Moreover, it is absolutely necessary to avoid a scenario where there are ‘first rate’ countries and ‘second rate’ countries (those which do not participate in such agreements). Reinforced integration agreements should have an open character and allow even the countries which join them at a later stage to enjoy an immediate and full participation[20].

The credibility of the solutions identified in this context is a key factor of the success of the current Intergovernmental Conference.

 4. The European Charter of Fundamental Rights

Discussions are going on on whether the European Charter of Fundamental Rights should be placed on the agenda of the IGC.

At the European Council of 4 June 1999 in Cologne, the Heads of State and Government considered that the time was ripe – "at the present stage of development of the European Union" – for the drawing up of a Charter of Fundamental Rights.

The Convention established to elaborate the draft Charter produced an updated version of the text on 13 September 2000, which will be further and finally examined by October, in order that the final draft may be tabled before the European Councils of Biarritz and, later, Nice in December. Following the conclusions reached at Cologne, "The European Council will propose to the European Parliament and the Commission that, together with the Council, they should solemnly proclaim on the basis of the draft document a European Charter of Fundamental Rights. It will then have to be considered whether and, if so, how the Charter should be integrated into the treaties".

4.1 Provisions of the draft Charter

At the present stage of the work of the Convention, we are able to exchange views on the, albeit provisional, contents of the draft.

The draft states that the Union of European peoples, based on the principles of democracy and the rule of law, is founded on the common values enshrined in the indivisible, universal principles of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity.

In respect of each of these principles, each person is recognised as having the fundamental rights deriving from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, the Treaty on European Union, the Community Treaties, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the Social Charters adopted by the Community and by the Council of Europe and the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Communities and of the European Court of Human Rights.

The principle of equality-diversity of universal rights affirmed in the Charter is not affected by the few exemptions provided for a number of political rights of European citizens (right to vote and to stand as a candidate in elections, and diplomatic and consular protection), also because the Strasbourg Court has already found such exemption legitimate, if caused by "reasons of overriding importance", amongst which is the political and institutional nature of the Union itself.

Provided certain conditions are met, nationals of third countries are granted, by undoubtedly innovative provisions, the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Union, the right to petition the European Parliament and to refer to the Ombudsman, the right of access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, the right to good administration by the institutions and bodies of the Union, and the right to have the Community make good any damage caused by these.

A wide-ranging debate has taken place on the issue of the indivisibility of civil, political and economic and social rights. Some, who do not share this principle, have proposed that economic and social rights be left out of the Charter, for these are not binding, enforceable rights, but guidelines, services to be rendered by welfare provisions which law-makers are called to adopt from time to time, at European and national level, according to economic conditions and available resources.

In view of the political and legal debate held in some Member States, the decision seems to prevail, whereby such category of rights[21] should be included in the Charter, regardless of their formal nature.

The result achieved seems to be balanced in terms of two fundamental common values in the Union: the principle of freedom of the individual from the interference and constraints of public authorities (negative freedom) and the principle of solidarity, which requires the active involvement of Member States and the Union, in accordance with their respective constitutional and regulatory frameworks and in order to achieve the objective of attaining living conditions which are satisfactory for all.

The mandate of the Cologne European Council to take into account not just the rights enshrined in Community law has rightly been construed by the Convention to mean that the review should not be confined to the received fundamental rights[22], but extended to the so-called "new-generation rights", linked to the progress achieved by society over the past decade through scientific research and technological innovation.

Among these new rights are the right to environmental protection, related to the principle of sustainable development (Article 36); the right to the protection of health, safety and the interests of consumers (Art. 37), the right to self-determination in bioethics (Art. 3) and the treatment of personal data (Art. 8), in a context of compatibility among the general interests of persons[23].

A common inspiration underlies the principles established in the Charter: ensuring everyone's right to life, a life led in dignity and freedom, in which everyone's personality may unfold and develop. The successful development of the culture of life, based on the principle of the inviolability of human dignity, implies that the life of every person, in every moment of his or her existence and regardless of any other conditions, is a fundamental value and should develop, as far as this is possible, in conditions which are equal amongst all human beings. It is no coincidence that the first fundamental right universally recognised by all States to all members of humankind is the right to life, to the respect of life from its beginning to its natural end, although the levels of such protection may vary widely from country to country. What follows from this is that "no one shall be condemned to the death penalty, or executed" (Art. 2).

4.2 The question of the legal value of the Charter and the protection of the rights recognised therein

What value should be given to the Charter and what protection should the principles it enshrines receive?

The solution of these problems depends essentially on if and how they will be incorporated into the treaties, also because even the European Council, while envisaging such integration, has postponed the decision on whether and, if so, how the Charter should be integrated into the treaties; this uncertainty stems from the opinion of those who believe that the necessary level of political and constitutional harmonisation of the Union has not been achieved, and the standards of protection of rights in the national systems are not homogeneous.

At the two extremes are those who would like to make the Charter a solemn political declaration, with no binding nature, and those who hold that its incorporation into the treaties should not meet any particular difficulty, because the principles it upholds are already in force in international and community law and in the legislation of Member States, since they are part and parcel of a common European legal culture.

Intermediate solutions have been proposed: incorporating the Charter in the treaties, either as a preamble or as an attached protocol open to the accession of States wishing to do so; or making it a part of European legislation by a joint decision of the Council and the European Parliament.

Once the question of the position of the Charter in relation to the system of the sources of European law has been solved, the question might arise of having a clause to enable the Charter to be amended.

It is evident that a catalogue of recognised rights is useful in so far as it is accompanied by a widespread obligation to enforce such rights.

But a tricky question arises here, as was underlined in particular by all EU candidate States: i.e. the co-ordination between the European Convention on Human Rights and the Charter being elaborated and the co-ordination between the European Human Rights Court and the Court of Justice.

There is concern for the possible emergence of different, if not contradictory, interpretations of the same right (which would lead to different standards of protection) by the various legal bodies to which citizens may apply at national, community and European level.

Hence, it has been proposed that the Union should formally accede to the European Human Rights Convention; in this way, the protection of fundamental rights would be entrusted by the Union to the Strasbourg Court.

But this solution is challenged by two considerations: first of all, this may not be done without previously amending the Treaty; secondly, the Convention does not envisage the accession of international organisations. It is no coincidence that the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has expressly recommended that the relevant provisions of the European Human Rights Convention be amended to enable the Union to accede to it.

In view of all this the Convention, after dealing with this issue at the beginning of its proceedings, set aside the whole problem, in consideration of the fact that neither the adoption of a Charter of Rights preempts the European Human Rights Convention, nor the accession to the Convention preempts the adoption of a Charter of Rights by the European Union. Special clauses envisage that no provision of the Charter may be construed as restricting or adversely affecting the rights and freedoms recognised by the European Human Rights Convention and the other international instruments to which the States are party.

Considering the Charter a political statement has not prevented members of the Convention to word the Charter in such a way that it can be immediately made legally binding[24].

The concerns of those countries which are more advanced in the field of safeguards, which were afraid that the Charter might surreptitiously increase the authority of the Union or adversely affect the rights already recognised to their citizens, seem to be dispelled by the clauses specifying that the Charter does not establish any new power or task for the Union; and that its provisions are essentially addressed at protecting citizens before the institutions of the Union and are addressed at Member States only when they are implementing Union law (Art. 50). Other clauses lay down that no provisions of the Charter shall be interpreted as restricting or adversely affecting freedoms as recognised by the Member States' constitutions (Art. 52).

 5. The question of the revision of treaties and the debate on the European  Constitution

In the course of the debate on the new institutional model of the European Union, the issue of the revision of treaties has been raised. The long-term objective would be to found the Union on the basis of a constitution. The issue has been repeatedly raised by the President of the Italian Republic, Mr Ciampi, on a number of visits abroad. In a communiqué released jointly with the President of the Federal Republic of Germany, Mr Rau[25], he underlined that the debate on the European constitution should be focused not on if, but on when and how.

The two Presidents have underlined that there are great expectations for the European Charter which, as a founding element of that constitution, would account for an essential frame of reference for governments and institutions, and an instrument of protection and guarantee for European nationals. This would prove that the ultimate source of legitimacy for Union institutions lies with the people and that there cannot be a European identity without full endorsement of the fundamental values of democracy and freedom[26].

I am sure that also candidate countries share such values and that enlargement may further strengthen the transition from a Europe of markets to a Europe of rights[27].

Whatever is the best way to reach these fundamental objectives, one cannot fail to realise that there is widespread acknowledgement of the important rôle of the Charter in involving European citizens in the construction of European institutions.

 6. Final assessment of the rôle of Parliaments

The first conclusion one may draw from these considerations is the need to find a common denominator among various Parliaments on the issues at hand. This common denominator should provide the basis for a further broader agreement, because the failure of only one Parliament to ratify the Charter would lead to a European crisis[28]. The negotiations under way concern issues which may not fail to influence the responsibility of Parliaments which, by virtue of their internal pluralism and their function as representatives of the civil society as a whole, may help find new solutions to overcome the many political stumbling stones outlined above.

Another issue at the core of the debate is the parliamentary model which should inform the European institutional system, and the rôle which representatives of the peoples of Europe should play in the decision-making process.

The oft-deplored democratic deficit also stems from the consideration that responsibilities previously pertaining to the national parliaments have been transferred to the Community without seeking the involvement of the European Parliament.

It must be noted here that many have expressed the view that the rôle of the European Parliament should be strengthened, since it is the assembly directly legitimated by the vote of the people, along with its position vis-à-vis the Council, which is the expression of Governments.

Among the proposals made to overcome such deficit is an extension of the co-decision procedures of Council and Parliament, and its application to all cases where a qualified majority vote is requested. Naturally, co-decision does entail problems: if a number of Parliaments maintain that it will strengthen the democracy of the Community system, others fear that, in default of a clear hierarchy of parliamentary vis-à-vis governmental regulatory instruments, co-decision will only make the decision-making process at governmental level more cumbersome.

A more important rôle for the European Parliament has also been requested in respect of the treaty revision process – the resolution passed by the Foreign Affairs and European Affairs Committees of the Italian Chamber of Deputies on 10 February 2000 commits the Government not to ratify the new treaty without prior approval of the European Parliament – and the ratification of international agreements entered by the European Union, although there is no consensus on this[29].

One may not fail to observe that the relation between Parliament and the Commission will evolve, after the progress made at Amsterdam, where the double vote, on the President and his commission, has already strengthened the relationship of confidence between the Union's Executive and the Parliament elected by the people of Member States.

National Parliaments must needs be involved in the European decision-making process – as has also been acknowledged in the above-mentioned protocol annexed to the Treaty of Amsterdam – in order to overcome the democratic deficit.

In its decision of 15 June 2000, the European Parliament has acknowledged that concerted action among national parliaments is desirable at least for some issues, like the cfsp, and has proposed the creation of a mixed body on the cfsp, to be modelled after the cosac.

In the framework of cooperation and collaboration agreements among Parliaments, proposals have emerged – aiming at influencing the rôle of European parliaments in the institutional framework – which do not call for an amendment of the treaties.

The analysis of the Community system shows the emergence of relations among the various institutional subjects of the Union and the Member States, which defy the conventional division of powers between the legislative and the executive and which at times lead to the development of a network of relations among Parliaments which, although not regulated by treaties – like this Conference of Presiding Officers –, may indirectly bear on the decision-making processes of the Union.

The emergence of this network of relations is being favoured not only by bodies recognised in treaties, like the cosac, but also by a growth of events, round tables, multilateral conferences proposed by the European Parliament or the national Parliaments[30], exchanges of bilateral visits of delegations of Parliamentary Committees or of Committee rapporteurs. In addition to personal contacts, modern technologies offer huge opportunities, both in terms of exchanging texts, comments, and amendments, and in terms of making texts available on the net, which increases transparency.

Among the concrete proposals emerged so far, mention should be made of the initiative launched through the Rome meeting of Chairpersons of European Affairs Committees, which followed similar events promoted by the Belgian and French Parliaments. It envisaged, by way of example, a strengthening of the national Parliaments' rôle in the Union's decision-making process through improved verification of the correct implementation of the principle of subsidiarity. The proposal includes a two-timed control: through early scrutiny of the legislative programme of the Commission at the first cosac meeting and through later regular scrutiny, still in cosac meetings, of the Commission's annual report. The initiative[31] has met with implementation obstacles, but deserves further consideration.

The web of relations developing among the Parliaments of Member States, between these and the European Parliament, and also between these and the Parliaments of candidate countries, is gaining importance. All these relations have positive effects on the capability of national Parliaments to effectively control and guide their respective governments.

Although they are not part of the treaty revision process, these initiatives contribute to the construction of what may be termed "material Constitution of the Union".

In our countries, lively discussions are under way on the future of the European Union, on constitutionalism, federalism, integration and subsidiarity; these are different yet complementary questions, on which sensitivity is high in all Parliaments. If we look beyond appearances to the more concrete questions, distances – though persistent – may appear less dramatic; countries talking openly of federalism may be fewer than those wishing to take part in the single currency, which is an essential tool of political and economic integration. In the course of its history, the construction of Europe has equally drawn from the contributions of both pragmatists and visionaries. The former approach enabled the construction of increasingly solid foundations, the latter gave impulse to powerful albeit irregular élans, without which the construction of Europe, far from progressing, might have regressed.

The need to conduct a deeper discussion on the common objectives proceeds side by side with the awareness that agreements on common solutions are at hand, in spite of the differences remaining on the principles. For instance, there is ample agreement on the need to revise treaties ­­ which – as has been cleverly proven by the European Institute of Florence – may be done without formally revising their provisions. The only difference being that some would seize the opportunity offered by the European Council at Nice, while others would prefer to achieve this goal after the conclusion of the present negotiations.

In such a perspective, instruments should be selected – and this forum is an ideal opportunity to do so – to gather information on the stances taken by the various Parliaments, the assessments and considerations which preceded them, moving from the assumption that a deeper knowledge of each other's views, concerns and priorities should facilitate our common path. In doing so, we must bear in mind the awareness that the growth of vertical and horizontal relations among Parliaments and between them and the other institutions of both Member States and the Union will help forging what has been termed "the material constitution of Europe", which is an integral part of the Europeans' awareness of a common history, culture, values, interests and, at the end of the day, a common fate.

[1] The relevance of this issue is demonstrated by the decisions concerning the composition of the organ in charge of drafting the Charter of Fundamental Rights.
[2] In particular, the protocol establishes a minimum period of time should elapse between the introduction of draft legislation by the Commission and examination by the Council with a view to enabling national Parliaments to express their views in conformity with their respective systems.
[3] The topic was “Present situation in the EU and the consequent tasks of national Parliaments with regard to democratisation and institutional reforms”. The debate that followed was so inspired that some participants, including the Vice President of the Senate - Sen. Rognoni - and the rapporteur himself proposed to establish a special working group on the issue and on the role of parliamentary co-operation.
[4] The so-called “left overs”, extension of majority vote, revised weighting of votes in the Council and review of the composition of the European Commission.
[5] Proposals were made at first by former European Commission President Delors, France’s former President Giscard d’Estaing and Germany’s former Chancellor Schmidt; later on, the topic was addressed by Germany’s Foreign Minister Fischer, France’s President Chirac and Italy’s President Ciampi. Some of them proposed models based on a bicameral system including representatives of national Parliaments. This proposal was also supported by members of the Parliament of Portugal, a country which played a crucial role, during its presidency, in launching the Intergovernmental Conference, defining its agenda and promoting its work.
[6] As indicated in the resolution adopted by the Danish Folketing on 23 February last.
[7] Including Italy, aligned on this topic with the President of the European Commission and the European Parliament.
[8] In this regard, cf. the debate on the reform of EU institutions held in the Italian Senate on 13 and 18 July 2000.
[9] A system allowing a limited group of countries to increase integration in certain areas in the absence of a unanimous agreement of all member states.
[10] As regards in particular EU jurisdictional organs, various proposals were advanced concerning the streamlining of contentious procedures, the simplification of procedures for the review of the respective rules and a possible revision of the competence of the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance.
[11] One of the most controversial issues is, for example, taxation. According to several Parliaments (including the Parliaments of Sweden, Finland – except for environmental taxes, for which majority voting is accepted -, France, Luxembourg and Netherlands, as well as the British House of Commons), taxation matters cannot be subject to qualified majority voting. In other cases, reservations have been expressed by some Parliaments with regard to other matters, such as economic and monetary union (France’s National Assembly), exemptions to EU law and the internal market (France’s National Assembly, Italy), environment (Austria), regional policies (Austria), social cohesion and security policies (Finland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, U.K. House of Commons), working conditions for third country citizens (Luxembourg), energy (Austria, Finland, France), right of movement and stay (Luxembourg), organisation of professional categories (Luxembourg), co-operation between national and EU administrative bodies on visa, asylum and immigration matters (Finland, France’s Senate and U.K. House of Commons), regulation of state aids (Finland), copyright policies (Finland), co-operation in criminal and police affairs (Finland, France, Luxembourg and the U.K. House of Commons), CFSP (Finland, France and U.K. House of Commons), external relations (France and U.K. House of Commons), appointments (France’s Senate, Luxembourg), sanctions against fundamental rights’ violations (France’s Senate), elections and European Parliament members’ status (Luxembourg) and choice of the seat of EU institutions (Luxembourg). See in this regard the contributions provided to the Conference and the replies to the COSAC questionnaire. However, according to some Parliaments, such as the House of Lords, it will not be possible to make significant progress concerning the extension of qualified majority voting, except for a limited number of technical, non controversial cases (cf. the report on the IGC of 18 July 2000).
[12] As stressed by the Portuguese Parliament in its reply to the COSAC questionnaire. According to the French Senate, in particular, the reweighting of votes in the Council is a condition for the extension of qualified majority vote.
[13] Supported by the House of Lords.
[14] As is clearly indicated in the document of the European Affairs Committee of the Irish Parliament adopted on 28 October 1998.
[15] As proposed also by the British House of Lords in the report on the IGC published last 18 July.
[16] The solution favoured by the House of Lords, should it not be possible to limit the number of Commissioners to less than twenty.
[17] Further proposals concerning the functioning and the organisation of the Commission, such as the proposal to formalise in the treaties the engagement of present Commissioners to resign in case the trust relationship with the President fails, meet with stronger opposition.
[18] Examples include the slow and complex incorporation of the Schengen agreements in the EU context and the impossibility to integrate the WEU permanently in the treaties.
[19] Cf. the debate held in the Italian Senate on the reform of EU institutions on 13 and 18 July; President Chirac’s speech in Berlin on 27 June 2000; the proposals made by Presidents Delors, Giscard and Schmidt on “Agence Europe” of 20-21 March, 29 March, 13 and 16 April 2000.
[20] Some Parliaments, such as the House of Lords, maintain it is unnecessary to modify current provisions on flexibility, as they have never been applied. The Portuguese Parliament, while recognising the potential offered by reinforced co-operation for the second and third pillar, underlined that its application in this context may put at risk the cohesion of the single market. The presence of this risk was also stressed by the U.K. House of Commons. Cf. also the replies to COSAC questionnaire.
[21] Amongst which, the workers' right to information and consultation within the undertaking, the rights of collective bargaining and action, including strike action, and the right to social security and assistance.
[22] Principles like the prohibition of trade in human beings or freedom of thought, conscience, religion and association, which have been the object of a number of international safeguards for a number of years.
[23] Regarding such rights, guarantees are provided: in Article 3, to the right to the integrity of the person, the obligation to respect, in the fields of medicine and biology, the free and informed consent of the person concerned, the prohibition of eugenic practices, the prohibition on making the human body and its parts as such a source of financial gain, and the prohibition of the reproductive cloning of human beings; in Article 8, to the protection of personal data, the obligation to process such data fairly, the consent of the person concerned, the right of the person concerned to access to data which has been collected concerning him or her, and the right to have it rectified.
[24] On these issues, national Parliaments have expressed their views through the replies of their respective European Affairs bodies to a cosac questionnaire. The binding nature of the Charter is supported by the Parliaments of Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg and Portugal. The German Bundesrat has also expressed its support for the incorporation of the Charter into European law (contribution of the Bundesrat to the Conference of Presiding Officers). The Bundesrat holds that the Charter should have a binding nature and may be later incorporated into the treaties under the procedures of Article 48 of the Treaty on the European Union. Denmark (contribution of the Danish Parliament to the Conference of Presiding Officers), Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom maintain the Charter should be considered a political statement. With respect to the relation between the Charter and the European Convention, most national Parliaments hold that the Charter should guarantee a level of protection which should not be lower than that of the European Convention, with which a higher level of co-ordination is desired. Sweden and the United Kingdom have expressed fears of complication and confusion in this relation. The UK House of Lords observed that a mere political declaration is inadequate to guarantee the safeguard of human rights in the European Union and expressed its support for the formal accession of the Union to the European Convention on Human Rights. The report submitted at the Feira meeting by the Portuguese Presidency stressed that it is unlikely that consensus will be achieved on the inclusion into the IGC agenda of the accession of the European Union to the Council of Europe. The Netherlands will have no problems if the Union accepts that the Strasbourg Human Rights Court becomes the supreme authority in the protection of human rights. For Sweden, it is important to ensure that the Strasbourg Court becomes a primus inter pares on human rights in Europe.
[25] On the occasion of a visit to Leipzig on 6 July 2000.
[26] The notion of a constitutional arrangement based on a constitution was put forward, although with different tones, both by President Chirac and by Minister Fischer, and the proposal to revise treaties to include a constitutional part based on the recognition of fundamental rights and the working of institutions was officially made in statements of both the European and the Italian Parliament (Senate European Affairs Committee Resolution of 15 March 2000, Chamber 3rd and 14th Committee Joint Resolution of 10 February 2000, and the two Migone et al. and Salvato et al. resolutions passed by the Senate on 18 July 2000). The European Parliament has proposed to revise the founding treaties by merging them into a consolidation law divided into a constitutional part on fundamental rights and institutional arrangements and another part on sectoral policies to be amended through simplified procedures.
[27] During the Convention's hearings of candidate countries, some of these, albeit sharing the prospected adoption of a Charter of Rights, have expressed their concern regarding the restraints that a binding nature of the Charter might put on their accession.
[28] As was appropriately observed by Mr Da Costa, representative of the Portuguese Presidency, in a statement reported by Agence Europe on 13 April 2000.
[29] The Danish Parliament, for instance, prefers the present intergovernmental procedure for the revision of treaties and does not wish the European Parliament to have a greater say in this respect.
[30] Through meetings which are becoming regular events, like the meetings of the Committees on Labour, the Environment, Economic and Monetary Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Transport.
[31] Upheld by Mr Langendries at the above-mentioned Vienna Conference of Presiding Officers of Parliament and reaffirmed by Mr Violante before the Conference of Presiding Officers.